Fearful Asymmetry

This article by Anshel Pfeffer is based on a report from the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. The point of it is that, however inferior in arms the Jihadists, Hezbollah, etc may be, in the information war, not only do they have considerable advantages, but they are using what they have very well indeed.

Pfeffer describes how open the IDF was to scrutiny even to the Arab TV networks. Just north, however, the situation was very different.

ON THE other side, Hizbullah controlled the journalists covering the situation in Lebanon with an iron fist. Media tours of Hizbullah-controlled areas, where the IDF's bombing was mainly concentrated, were tightly managed, with foreign reporters being sternly warned against wandering off and talking to local residents unsupervised. Infringement of these rules would be punished by the confiscation of cameras and disbarment from any further visits or access to Hizbullah members. According to Kalb, only CNN's Anderson Cooper openly admitted to having operated under these rules.

This is not control for its own sake. They were building a storyline.

Hizbullah also forbade any photographs of its fighters. Cameramen were warned never to show men with guns or ammunition. The only armed personnel seen during this war were IDF soldiers; Hizbullah remained throughout a phantom army.

Another scene almost never shown was the hundreds of Hizbullah firing positions and missile launch sites within residential areas and private homes, the cause of many civilian deaths and a violation of international law.

The images told the story: this war was unarmed civilians against heavily armed (Israeli) soldiers. Civilians = Victims. Soldiers = Oppressors. Simple. Clear. Wrong.

The coming war

The next war against Israel is being prepared. It will, of course, be entirely the fault of the Israelis if anyone dies. The Times.

Hezbollah, the militant Shia organisation, is building a new line of defences just north of the United Nations-patrolled zone in south Lebanon ahead of a potential resumption of war with Israel.

The military build-up, only six months after the last Lebanon-Israel conflict, is being conducted in valleys and hillsides guarded by uniformed Hezbollah fighters in the rugged mountains north of the Litani river — the limit of the 12,000 strong UN Interim Force In Lebanon (Unifil).
Christian and Druze-owned land is being bought for cash by a Shia businessman. Hezbollah’s opponents believe the goal is to create a Shia-populated belt spanning the northern bank of the Litani, allowing the Lebanese group to operate away from prying eyes.

“The state of Hezbollah is already in existence in south Lebanon,” the Druze leader and arch Hezbollah critic Walid Jumblatt told The Times.

From another article in The Times:

These purchases will create a continuous Shia zone running from the edge of the long-disputed Shebaa Farms area all the way across to the coastline. Lebanon is in effect being physically divided by this initiative. This is terrain in which Hezbollah will soon be able to function much as it wishes. It is beyond the reach of the UN and its soldiers. It is already being described in the region as a “new Maginot Line”.

There is, though, a crucial difference. The original Maginot Line was defensive in its character. This one is not.

In a speech given in South Beirut on February 16, 2007, Hassan Nasrallah said

We are being very clear and we are saying that we have arms. We are not lying and [we are] telling it to the whole world. ...It [Hezbollah] is saying it in public, adding that it is rearming and increasing the scope of its armament in order to get more dangerous arms…

The resistance [i.e., Hezbollah] notes that it is transporting the arms to the front. We stress our commitment to the resistance [interpret as you wish], to the cause of the resistance and to the project of the resistance that defends the homeland...

Hezbollah… is willing to wage jihad and persist with its struggle for justice in all areas…

I am not Osama bin Laden

Michael Totten interviews Sayyed Mohammad Ali El Husseini, a Shia alama who lives in the dahiyeh, the Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut. He is, however, firmly opposed to Hezbollah, wants the Iranians out, is grateful to Bush for getting the Syrians out, is a bit cagey about Israel, approves of the American removal of Saddam Hussein and seems favourably disposed towards democracy, or at least, sees dictatorship as violence. In other words, not your raving Muslim cleric that we can't get enough of. I wish we'd heard from blokes like this during the Cartoons ruckus or similar upheavals in the Arab and Muslim Street.

While I was in Germany, I met a student. He told me that I am a Muslim, that I am a terrorist. I told him that he is the German, that he burned people. I said Why are you talking to me? I didn’t burn anybody. I told him also that I didn’t terrorize anybody, and that I was the first person to condemn what Osama bin Laden did to America on 9/11. I told him that we, the Shia people, in Iraq we were the first victims. Saddam killed civilian people, he cut off our heads, he blew up our houses. I told him that Hitler burned the Jews. Nobody in the world has done what he did. Then I told him we are the same. You are German, and you are not Hitler. I am a Muslim, but I am not Osama bin Laden.”
[Italics in original]

Wish I'd been there for that conversation. About the Hezbollah protests in downtown Beirut

“All of those people,” Husseini said, “most of them, who go to the protest downtown have no work to do. They earn 30 dollars per day.”

“Being downtown they get paid 30 dollars a day?” I said.

“Yes,” he said. “If they had work to do, they will not go down there. This is Iranian money, the green money. Nasrallah talked about it. We must exchange it with government money.”

Armed information

I think there is little doubt that in the Muslim world, and to a great degree in the West, the image of the US is tarnished, to put it mildly. At best, it is seen as a heavy-handed keeper of the status quo; at worst, as an oppressive imperial power willing to kill on a 'vast' scale just to ensure oil supplies and a military presence in the region that holds those resources.

Many (me, included) have blamed the media and kept gimlet-eyes on it to bore through the facade of objectivity and to pick out and hold up the weavils that demonstrate the opposite. They are not difficult to find, especially with regard to Israel. But it's not enough.

Not enough, I mean, to explain the losses we have suffered in the information war. So often it has seemed that what has been gained with vast expenditures of energy, time, wealth and blood can be lost in an instant, in the time it takes for some nutter to press a button on his belt. So often it has seemed that every move we make, no matter how successful in terms of military or economic targets reached, is a mere blundering that destroys more than it protects.

One of the reasons for my enthusiasm for that post on Blackfive that I linked to yesterday was that no only does he explain why it seems that way, but he goes on to analyse what we can do about it. Today I clicked on some of the links he supplies, including the one that is the source for a lot of his ideas (among which, the word 'disaggregation').

It turns out that we have an Australian army captain called David Kilcullen to thank for these insights. And two experiences that got him thinking.

The first was a visit in 1993 to a museum dedicated to the defeat of a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam in the sixties. He wanted to understand how the Indonesian government achieved victory (in part, by doing what the coalition is not allowed to do in Iraq). But then, as he was writing, he witnessed the rise of Jemaah Islamiya in the same region as before as well as the success of the separatist Christian movement in East Timor. The Indonesians used the tactics that had brought them success in the first war, but to no avail. Why not? What was different? Kilcullen got to thinking.

I am not going to even try to cover all the ground he does. Just a couple of examples. He concluded, as many have in the last couple of years, that this is more an information war than a military one. He recalls listening to a bin Laden tape and his list of grievances against America: Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, global warming. Global warming? “I thought, Hang on! What kind of jihadist are you?” He gives several examples of where the point of an action (such as 9/11) is not just to kill, but more importantly send a message to the 'constituency' and to the enemy (us). For example,

As soon as the recent fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israeli troops ended, Hezbollah marked, with its party flags, houses that had been damaged. Kilcullen said, “That’s not a reconstruction operation—it’s an information operation. It’s influence. They’re going out there to send a couple of messages. To the Lebanese people they’re saying, ‘We’re going to take care of you.’ To all the aid agencies it’s like a dog pissing on trees: they’re saying, ‘We own this house—don’t you touch it.’ ” He went on, “When the aid agencies arrive a few days later, they have to negotiate with Hezbollah because there’s a Hezbollah flag on the house. Hezbollah says, ‘Yeah, you can sell a contract to us to fix up that house.’ It’s an information operation. They’re trying to generate influence.”

Another reason that this analysis strikes me as something more than wishful thinking is its hard-headedness. No sentimental delusions.

[W]inning hearts and minds is not a matter of making local people like you—as some American initiates to counterinsurgency whom I met in Iraq seemed to believe—but of getting them to accept that supporting your side is in their interest, which requires an element of coercion. Kilcullen met senior European officers with the NATO force in Afghanistan who seemed to be applying “a development model to counterinsurgency,” hoping that gratitude for good work would bring the Afghans over to their side. He told me, “In a counterinsurgency, the gratitude effect will last until the sun goes down and the insurgents show up and say, ‘You’re on our side, aren’t you? Otherwise, we’re going to kill you.’ If one side is willing to apply lethal force to bring the population to its side and the other side isn’t, ultimately you’re going to find yourself losing.” Kilcullen was describing a willingness to show local people that supporting the enemy risks harm and hardship.

There's an article from the New Yorker about Kilcullen and two pieces by the man himself: Twenty-Eight Articles - Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency (pdf) and Counterinsurgency Redux (pdf).

Rich and free

Michael Totten in Beirut chats with some Hezbollah kids in the tent city. And they really sound like kids. Here's one exchange.

“So, what is it you hope to accomplish downtown?” I said.
“We want Seniora to leave,” one of them said.
“We want to fuck Seniora,” said another.
“I know,” I said. “Why do you want to get rid of him, though? What do you want from the government that you can’t get with Seniora?”
“War!” said one of the kids.
“We want war!” said another.

Which is followed soon after by this:

“We don’t hate the American people, only the government.”
“Okay,” I said. “So why then does Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly say Death to America?” I asked these questions in the most friendly and casual tone of voice I could muster.
“He only means death to the American government.”
“Why doesn’t he make that clear then?” I said.
“He does!”
“No, he doesn’t,” I said. “He says Death to America. What would you think of George W. Bush if he gave speeches where he screamed Death to Lebanon? Come on, guys. Be honest with me. I want to know what you really think.”
“I want to go to America,” the leader kid said. “I love America and I want to live in America. America is rich and free. I want to be rich and free, too.”

And read this piece by Jules Crittenden about Iran's good works in another sphere of influence.

They make great Santas

I don't wish to take easy pot-shots, but ... In addition to putting presents into the hands of children, has UNIFIL actually removed any weapons from the hands of Hezbollah fighters? Has the presence of the German or French warships stopped Syria re-arming Hezbollah?

"When a ship carrying weapons for Hezbollah leaves a Syrian port and heads south, its captain feels safe as long as he doesn't stray more than 11 kilometers from the coast," says Gad Shimron, an Israeli security expert who works for the daily Ma'ariv. The Syrian captain can head comfortably for Hezbollah positions in Lebanon, Shimron elaborates, as if he were shipping a cargo of tomatoes or olives, and the German navy isn't allowed to interfere with his journey.

Photo from Speigel Online here, and article from the same source here.

Israeli-Palestinian truce

I find this sudden outbreak of peace extremely difficult to take seriously. Israel is weaker now than it has been for many years, so it is not surprising that its government wants a period of relative calm. But Hamas has been able to land more blows on its enemy than ever and the situation in Lebanon, however uncertain its outcome may be, is almost certainly going to be more favourable to Hezbollah and Iran than it is now.

What's in it for them? Has Hamas suddenly renounced its ultimate goal? Hardly. They need time to prepare a more convincing attack and maybe to allow their friends in the North to take a few more steps towards control of Lebanon.

Syria/Iran on the offensive in Lebanon

What's going on in Lebanon? Walid Phares in the World Defense Review seems to have said it a week ago.

1. ...the aim of Hezbollah's summer war with Israel, was to provoke a "strike-back" at the Lebanese Government and reshape the balance of power in Lebanon to the advantage of the Teheran-Damascus axis. Nasrallah and his allies across the sectarian divide aimed at shifting the issue of disarming Hezbollah and militias (according to UNSCR 1559) to crumbling the government, which is supposed to implement this disarming process.

2. By mid-October, Hezbollah and its pro-Syrian allies had begun a political counter offensive aiming at "enlarging" the Seniora cabinet, as a way to paralyzing it further from the inside. The political discussions took longer than anticipated by Hezbollah. Hence, a decision was made in Tehran (and subsequently in Damascus ) to move forward.

3. The perceived results of the midterm elections in the U.S. were read as positive by Tehran and its allies, in the sense that it froze vigorous reactions by the U.S. against any Iranian-Syrian move in Lebanon via Hezbollah. The feelings in Tehran and Damascus, have been that if in the next weeks and months a "thrust" takes place in Lebanon to the advantage of the pro-Syrian camp, Washington will be in no position to react or counter. Ahmedinijad and Assad believe (or have been advised to believe) that "lobbies" are moving in Washington and Brussels to restrain any strong deterrence by the U.S. against the "axis." The theory is that the Bush Administration is too busy "negotiating" with the new leadership in Congress to "dare" a mass move in the Middle East. The analysis also predicts that strong lobbies within the Democratic Party are now positioned to block any serious response to a change in geopolitics in Lebanon. It is believed that the window of opportunity won't be too long before the Administration and the upcoming Congress "understands" the Tehran-Damascus maneuver and create a unified response. Thus, the expectation is that Hezbollah and its allies were told to achieve their goals before the end of the year, and before the new Congress begin business on the Hill.

4. Hezbollah has mobilized its forces from all over the country to position them in the capital and eventually use them in moves in Beirut, the central and southern part of Mount Lebanon, where most government institutions are located. Nasrallah can also bring into "battle" the supporters of General Michel Aoun, the Syrian National-Socialists, the Baathists, and the pro-Syrian Sunni militias, the Islamic Fundamentalists paid by Syria, the Palestinian radicals and the security agencies still under the influence of Syria. This "huge" army can – technically – defeat the thin internal security forces of the government. The Lebanese Army is an unknown factor, with Hezbollah supporters in control of the military regions in the south, the Bekaa, southern suburbs and other positions. In short, the "axis army" is ready to engage in battle in Lebanon. The issue is when, how, and with what outcome.

5. The projected scenario is as follows: Hezbollah and Amal movement ministers will resign from the Government calling for the resignation of the Government. The next move is to have Hezbollah, Amal, and their allies in the Parliament also resign, thus creating "conditions" for what they will coin as new elections and a collapse of the cabinet. Most of these moves have already been accomplished or are on the eve of being implemented. The pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud will declare the Government and the Parliament as "illegitimate," and call for early legislative elections. The latter, if they take place will be under the smashing influence of Hezbollah's weapons (a show of force was performed in the summer) and of the cohorts of militias and security agencies. Result: a pro-Syrian-Iranian majority in parliament, followed by the formation of an "axis" government in Lebanon. The rest is easy to predict: A terrorism victory.

Sounds bang on to me. No mention of assassinations, though.

(via Dinocrat)